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Introduction 
Populism has been on the rise for some time in Europe now, and its rise has been one of the 
key concerns of Peter Mair. Peter has linked it to the increasing erosion of the representative 
function of European party systems. In numerous publications, he has observed a number of 
converging trends which characterize all West European countries and which all point to the 
decline of parties as intermediaries between the citizens and public policy: declining party 
membership and party identification, declining voter turnout, and increasing volatility of the 
vote. The spectre that haunted Peter was ‘partyless democracy’, a democratic regime where 
parties had lost their representative function, which opened the door for populist protest. I 
would like to address this populist challenge and discuss the way Peter dealt with it in his 
work. 
In my discussion of the populist challenge in Western Europe, I shall attempt to put the trends 
Peter identified in a somewhat different perspective. While sharing his overall assessment of 
the origins of the populist challenge in this part of Europe, I do not necessarily share the 
implications he drew for the further development of the West European party systems. More 
optimistic in my assessment than Peter was, I would like to suggest that populism is a produc-
tive force that may serve as the catalyst for a profound realignment of West European party 
systems – a realignment that brings the West European party systems more in line with the 
transformed conflict structures of West European societies. 
The erosion of the representative function of political parties that preoccupied Peter is a West 
European phenomenon, which means that the scope of his discussion of populism was largely 
confined to Western Europe. But the rise of populism has not been limited to Western Europe. 
It has also been rampant in Central and Eastern European countries since they have made their 
transition to democracy. The reasons for the rise of populism in these countries, however, has 
little to do with erosion of the parties’ representative function. Instead, what has plagued the 
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party systems in these parts of Europe was their insufficient institutionalization which gave 
rise to a quite specific type of populism. After having discussed the populist challenge in 
Western Europe, I shall extend the discussion of populism to Central and Eastern European 
countries, in order to point out the different origins of the rise of populism in the two parts of 
Europe, and to identify the specificities of the two at first sight very similar phenomena.  
Before getting to Peter’s assessment of the populist challenge, however, let me briefly clarify 
what is commonly understood under the term ‘populism’. As suggested by Peter’s former 
student, Cas Mudde (2004: 543), the term populism refers to a ‘thin’ ideology that can be 
defined as ‘an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous 
and antagonistic groups – ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’, and which argues that 
politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’. This 
definition includes the existence of two homogenous groups – ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, the 
antagonistic relationship between the two, the idea of popular sovereignty, and the positive 
valorisation of ‘the people’ combined with the denigration of ‘the elite’. Most importantly, 
populism has a monolithic conception of the people. As Canovan (2002: 34) points out, the 
people is always conceived as a homogenous category, a unity, a corporate body capable of 
having common interests and a common will – a ‘volonté générale’.  
For populists, the people are paramount. But, given the diverse interpretations of ‚the people‘, 
it is impossible to arrive at a clear-cut definition of the phenomenon without giving ‚the 
people‘ a more specific meaning. Populism’s meaning varies with the understanding given to 
‚the people‘, i.e. to the idealized conception of the community (the ‚heartland‘) to which it 
applies. It is precisely for this reason that populism is a ‘thin’ ideology which needs to be 
associated with more substantive ideologies to become a ‚thick‘ ideology. Following Mény 
and Surel (2000) we can identify at least three conceptions of ‚the people‘ – a political one 
(the people as sovereign), a cultural one (the people as a nation) and an economic one (the 
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people as a class). The notion of the people as nation is typically associated with right-wing 
populism, while the notion of people as a class (the class of the downtrodden which stands for 
the people as a whole) is characteristic of left-wing populism. The people as sovereign implies 
a specific vision of democracy. While it may be part of both left and right-wing versions of 
populism, it may also be the genuine element that is less concerned with national exclusive-
ness or class struggle, and more with the functioning of democracy per se.  
Whatever the meaning of the people, the general conception of populism as a ‚thin‘ ideology 
implies quite a specific perspective on democracy. The populist theory of democracy is rarely 
made explicit, but it provides the key to the understanding of the populist ideology. Populism 
is, according to the minimal definition of Pappas (2013, 2013a), ‘democratic illiberalism’. 
First of all, populist democracy is illiberal, because it takes ‚government by the people‘ 
literally and rejects all checks and balances on the popular will. Constitutive elements of 
liberal, ‚Madisonian‘ democracy – the rule of law, the division of power or respect for the 
rights of minorities – are rejected because they confine the people’s sovereignty. In addition, 
populist democracy also is an illiberal vision of democracy because of its monolithic 
conception of the people, which implies that the popular majority (the ‘general will’) is 
always right (Riker 1982: 8-16), and it is illiberal because of its hostility to the ‘aristocratic 
element’ (Manin 1995: 174-191) of representative democracy – the fact that the represen-
tatives constitute a selective political elite that cannot be controlled on a daily basis. Populists 
are against all kinds of intermediaries between the people and the decision-makers, and 
against political parties in particular (Pasquino 2008: 21). They plead for a more direct 
linkage of masses to elites (Taggart 2002: 67). The central populist message is that politics 
has escaped popular control and that popular control has to be restored1. In general, populism 
has a strong anti-institutional impulse – ‘the romantic impulse of directness, spontaneity and 
                                                     
1 Similarly, Mény and Surel (2000: 181) identify three elements at the core of populist ideology: a) the people 
constitutes the foundation of the community, b) its superior legitimacy is flouted by some actors or processes, 
which has to be denounced, and c) the people’s place in society has to be re-established. 
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the overcoming of alienation’, which it shares with other ‘redemptive’ visions of democracy 
(Canovan 1999: 10).  
The populist attempt to provide a closer link between the citizens and the decision-makers 
may take different forms, but the characteristic way for the populist vision of democracy to 
provide such a direct linkage between the people and those who govern is to introduce a 
charismatic leader (or a political organization). This leader does not belong to the established 
political elites, but is an outsider (a new challenger), who incarnates the demands of ‚the 
people‘. The populist leader has direct, unmediated access to the people’s grievances, and acts 
as the spokesperson of the vox populi (Abts 2011: 930). The monolithic conception of the 
leader (there is only one) or the leader’s political organization (it is hierarchically structured 
and centralized) corresponds to the monolithic conception of ‚the people‘. The leader as the 
spokesperson of the vox populi is, in fact, one with the people whose deepest feelings he (or 
she) articulates2. The direct, populist form of representation by a charismatic leader promises 
to make politics transparent by offering ‚a short-cut that bypasses philosophical disputes and 
institutional niceties‘ (Canovan 2002: 34)3. 
Let me conclude this short discussion of the concept of populism by pointing out an important 
distinction which I take from Jagers and Walgrave (2007) – the distinction between populist 
ideology and populist communication strategies: the populist ideology manifests itself in the 
political communication strategies of populist leaders. Such strategies appeal to and identify 
with the people seen as a unified unambiguously positive entity, they tap into feelings of 
resentment against the elites, and they call for increased power to the people (March 2012). 
As an expression of the populist ideology, populist communication strategies may be used to 
                                                     
2 Arditi (2003: 22) speaks of ‚a joint presence without representation‘ to characterize the immediate presence of 
both the people and the leader. 
3It provides a triple simplification (Rosanvallon 2011: 6-7): a) a political simplification by considering the 
people as an obvious subject; b) a procedural simplification by maintaining that the established elites are corrupt 
and that the only real form of democracy is the direct appeal to the people; and c) a structural simplification by 
maintaining that the social cohesion of society is provided by an identity, usually defined in negative terms, and 
not by the quality of the social relations.  
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identify the populist ideology empirically, i.e. the operationalization of the populist ideology 
may be based on an analysis of populist communication strategies. 
 
 
Preconditions for the rise of populism in West European democracies 
 
Arguably, political parties are the most important organizations linking voters and their 
representatives in established democracies. But parties have a double function: they not only 
link civil society to the polity, they also organize and give coherence to the institutions of 
government. As Peter Mair (2009: 5) observes, their unique contribution to the development 
of modern democracy was that they combined these two crucial roles (representation and 
government) into one. However, as Katz and Mair’s (1995, 2009) highly influential ‘cartel 
party thesis’ has maintained, in Western democracies, parties moved their centre of gravity 
from civil society to the state and have begun to shift from combining representative and 
governmental roles to strengthening their governmental role – at the detriment of their 
representation function. Peter has not ceased to document empirically the erosion of the 
parties’ role as intermediaries between the citizens and public policy (e.g. Mair 2006). 
Relying on party membership as the strongest and most consistent indicator, together with 
Ingrid van Biezen and Thomas Poguntke (van Biezen et al. 2012), he documented the 
dramatic decline of party membership ratios over the last thirty years and concluded (p. 42) 
that parties ‘have all but abandoned any pretensions to being mass organizations’.  
I would like to suggest, very much in line with Peter’s own interpretations, I think, that the 
erosion of the parties’ representation function in Western Europe has deeper structural roots, 
which are related to two major challenges of contemporary democracy – the increased 
importance of the European and the global level in the contemporary multilevel governance 
structures and the increasing mediatisation of politics. Let me first turn to the structural 
changes introduced by the embedding of national governments into increasingly important 
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supra- and international governance structures – i.e. to the increasing denationalization of 
politics and policy-making. As is well known, these structural changes lead to the 
empowerment of the executive branch at the detriment of parliament, which, in turn, serves to 
reinforce the governing function of the parties who routinely govern, at the detriment of their 
representative function (which operates above all through parliament). Second, the addition of 
a European level of decision-making has led to longer, and more in-transparent chains of 
delegation, which has, in turn, reduced the accountability of the political decision-makers. 
This increasing lack of accountability has been reinforced by the fact that, as Peter Mair 
(2009) has observed, the parties which routinely govern are exposed to an increasing tension 
between their role as representatives of the national citizen publics, and their role as respon-
sible governments. As representatives of the national citizen public, they are expected to be 
responsive and accountable to their voters; as responsible governments, they are expected to 
take into account the increasing number of principals constituted by the many veto players 
who now surround the government in its multilevel institutional setting. This extension of the 
scope of accountability not only implies that the governing parties’ manoeuvring space is 
reduced, but also and most importantly that their accountability to the national constituency of 
voters, i.e. their representative function, is diminished.  
Finally, the increasing importance of supra- and international governance structures 
contributes to the increasing divorce between ‘front-stage’ and ‘back-stage’ politics at the 
national level. The electoral channel has, of course, never been the only channel of 
representation at the national level in established democracies. It has always been 
complemented by the administrative channel and protest politics and, in some countries, by a 
direct-democratic channel. However, the increasing importance of the European Union and 
other supranational actors has reinforced representation in the administrative channel at the 
detriment of the electoral channel. In other words, so called ‘non-majoritarian’ forms of repre-
sentation in a range of arenas that are not directly electorally accountable, little visible, and 
8 
 
operating ‘back-stage’ have become more important than the ‘front-stage’ of the electoral 
channel, which contributes to the hollowing out of the parties’ representation function that has 
always focused on the electoral channel. 
These implications of the increasing importance of supra- and international governance 
structures for the parties’ representation function are reinforced and decisively shaped by the 
effects of mediatisation. The mediatisation of politics contributes to the shifting balance of 
party functions by reducing the role of the party apparatus, by linking the parties’ leaders 
more directly to their voters, by enhancing the personalization of political leadership, and by 
fostering the ‘depoliticization’ of the party base. First of all, the increasing autonomy of the 
media from the political system and their increasing role for politics leads to the adaptation of 
politicians, parties and governments to the imperatives of the ‘media logic’. Parties and 
politicians devote more attention to what Esser (2013) calls the ‘self-mediatization of 
politics’, i.e. the self-initiated stage-management of politics by means of strategic 
communication in an effort to master the new rules that govern access to the public sphere. 
Politicians, parties and governments professionalize their internal and external commu-
nication and devote more of their resources to communication (Esser and Matthes 2013). 
Professional communication specialists at the service of party leaders and governments are 
replacing party militants. The party leaders communicate directly with the public audience via 
the media and they no longer need the party apparatus to get their message to their consti-
tuency.  
This reliance on more direct communication between the party leaders and the public 
audience of the voters contributes to the personalization of power, since the success of the 
party increasingly depends on the communication qualities of its leaders (Garzia (forth-
coming). As we have seen, populism implies the mobilization by charismatic personal 
leadership. Personalized leadership is a natural corollary of populism’s reaction against 
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politics-as-usual (Canovan 1999: 6). What seems to be occurring as a result of the expansion 
of the ‘media logic’ in politics is that personalized leadership also becomes part of politics-as-
usual. Accordingly, Mény and Surel (2000: 124) arrive at the conclusion that never before has 
charisma had as important a role as it has today, not only in politics, but also in economics 
and religion. This argument reminds us of Max Weber’s (1992: 44-49) vision of a ‘plebis-
citary democracy’. However, in Max Weber’s view, which built on his observation of 
democratic politics in the early twenties of the last century, the party leader was something of 
a ‘plebiscitary dictator’, because he was able to mobilize the masses by using the party 
apparatus (the ‘party machine’, including the foot soldiers of the regular party members). 
Relying on media-centred communication, by contrast, the contemporary party leader is able 
to mobilize the masses largely without the party apparatus.  
Mediatisation also reinforces the uncoupling of ‘front-stage’ and ‘back-stage’ politics. On the 
one hand, as is argued by Esser (2013), the ‘front-stage’ of the political process, i.e. the politi-
cal contest side of ‘politics’, is more easily subjected to self-mediatisation by politicians than 
the ‘back-stage’ of policy-making. The on-going ‘back-stage’ policy-making processes 
generally are too numerous for the limited scope of public attention, they need to be kept out 
of the limelight to protect the negotiators’ room for manoeuver, and they often are too 
complex and too technical for detailed public scrutiny. On the other hand, the journalists’ 
practices in a professionalized and commercialized media system – negative reporting, horse-
race journalism (focusing on strategies, personalities and campaign tactics), conflict-focus, 
personalization, infotainment and their intrusive or interventionist reporting (journalists 
reporting on politics in their own words granting politicians only limited opportunities to 
present themselves with their own voice) – mainly tend to focus on the political contest at the 
detriment of the policies’ substantive content.  
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This, in turn, contributes to the ‘depoliticization’ of politics – politics either becomes a 
technocratic exercise (‘back-stage’ politics) or a largely symbolic contest between figureheads 
(‘front-stage’ politics). In Peter’s analysis, the reduction of politics on the ‘front-stage’ to 
symbolic contests was reinforced by the convergence of the parties that habitually govern in 
ideological terms – by the fact that they tend to become increasingly similar in terms of the 
policies they defend. As a result, while ‘party leaderships retreat into institutions, drawing 
their terms of reference ever more readily from their roles as governors or public-office 
holders’, ‘citizens retreat into private life or more specialized and often ad hoc forms of 
representation’ (Mair 2006: 33). 
Last, but certainly not least, the role of the media for politics is currently transformed by the 
development of new forms of political communication as a result of the availability of new 
media. Thus, the internet and in particular the social media have generated new forms of 
campaigning allowing for a closer interaction between the public and the party leaders. This 
has created a new media logic and new forms of ‘media-centred’ political communication, 
which not only reinforces the autonomy of the media and allows for a direct link between the 
political leaders and the public, but also runs against the grain of the mediatisation thesis as it 
has been developed so far. Thus, the interactive characteristics of these new media have the 
potential for new forms of politicization, and for a reconnection of ‘front-stage’ and ‘back-
stage’ politics. In any case, they provide a powerful tool for populist challengers who seek to 
mobilize outside of the established channels of political communication. 
 
The populist challenge in West European democracies 
Peter Mair (2000) summarized these tendencies by what he called the rise of a ‘partyless 
democracy’. As he suggested (Mair 2002: 91), ‘populist democracy may be understood as 
popular democracy without parties’. What he had in mind was a largely neutral and non-par-
11 
 
tisan system of governance, appealing to a largely undifferentiated mass electorate whose 
relations with the institutions of government are no longer mediated to any significant extent 
by traditional political parties. His exemplary case of this phenomenon was the British New 
Labour government under Tony Blair: ‘non partisan leaders with a non-partisan programme 
running a non-partisan government in the interest of the people as a whole’ (Mair 2002: 96). 
As Peter Mair (2002: 88) saw it, such a ‘partyless democracy’ was intimately linked to 
populism as it is more commonly understood and as I have conceptualized it in the 
introduction, since it made it all the more easy for populist challengers to mobilize:  
‘As party leaderships become increasingly remote from the wider society, and as they 
also appear increasingly similar to one another in ideological or policy terms, it simply 
becomes that much easier for populist protestors to rally against the supposed privileges 
of an undifferentiated political class. As party democracy weakens, therefore, the oppor-
tunities for populist protest clearly increases’.  
In other words, the decline of the parties’ representative function – brought about, among 
other things, by the increasing importance of supra- and international governance structures 
and the increasing mediatization of politics – contributes to the alienation of the voters from 
the traditional political process. The voters get the impression that the parties who habitually 
govern are all alike, that they all betray the public behind the scene, and that they all merit to 
be sanctioned by a popular vote in the upcoming elections. In other words, the decline of the 
parties’ representation function invites populist reactions in the traditional sense.  
In a reassessment of their original thesis, Katz and Mair (2009: 757) conceded that not all 
parties are part of the ‘cartel’, and in yet another contribution (Mair 2011), Peter has added 
that we might observe a division of labor between two types of parties: on the one side, he put 
the parties which habitually govern and take responsibility – the mainstream parties or the 
core of the party system. On the other side, he put the parties which give voice to the people, 
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i.e. which fulfil the representation function and which often adopt a rather populists style. In 
other words, Peter Mair (2011: 14) thought that ‘it is possible to speak of a growing divide in 
the European party system between parties which claim to represent, but don’t deliver, and 
those which deliver, but are no longer seen to represent’. In a nutshell, he expected a division 
of labour between ‘partyless populism’ by the mainstream parties, and ‘protest populism’ 
mobilized by permanent challenger parties at the margin of the party system.  
While being a largely accurate assessment of the empirical situation of West European party 
systems at the time of Peter’s writing, his notion of a division of labour between two types of 
parties strikes me as excessively static. It does not allow for the possibility of a dynamic 
transformation of the populist challengers, on the one hand, and of the party systems in 
question, on the other hand. According to my own assessment of the current state of West 
European party systems, the division of labour envisaged by Peter may be of a transitory 
nature. Indeed, as I see it, the rise of ‘protest populism’ takes three different forms, all of 
which have the potential to transform the configurations of these systems as we have known 
them:  
• the rise of new challengers in the party system,  
• the radical rejection of the party system as such, and  
• the expansion of conflict beyond the party system.  
I take up these three forms of ‘protest populism’ one by one. Peter’s argument of a division of 
labour between two types of parties seems to assume that a majority of voters continue to opt 
for the mainstream parties, even if they no longer feel represented by them. There is, however, 
no reason why this assumption should hold in the not so long run: there is, first of all, the 
distinct possibility that the new challengers in the party system take up the representative 
function by politicizing the conflicts which have been neglected or ‘depoliticized’ by the 
established mainstream parties. It is quite possible – and against the background of the ‘Great 
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Recession’ that has hit Europe in 2008 and the economic consequences of which are still with 
us at the time of this writing, increasingly likely – that the attempt of the mainstream parties 
to focus on the management of the public affairs will fail and that they will be forced to face 
new challengers who give voice to the suppressed conflicts and succeed in ‘bringing the 
voters back in’. Moreover, it is quite likely that these new challengers do so in a populist 
manner, insisting on the betrayal of the people by the political elite.  
As a ‘thin’ ideology, populism can be easily combined with different ‘thick’ ideologies 
(Mudde 2004: 544), which elaborate the common core of the ‘sovereign people’ in various 
ways – in terms of class, nation, ‘losers’ of different stripes. In other words, the populists’ thin 
core messages are likely to have a substantive complement that speaks to the grievances of a 
specific part of the population which is taken to be the whole by the populist discourse. Their 
‘thin’ populist ideology is likely to be associated with substantive demands that relate to these 
grievances and that are linked to a more elaborate ideology. The decline of the established 
parties’ representation function has freed the voters from their partisan ideologies and loyal-
ties, but, at the same time, made them increasingly available for the sirens of new political 
forces promising to cater to their needs. As a result, the new populist challengers may be the 
driving forces of processes of restructuration and realignment of the party system (Kitschelt 
2000, Kitschelt and Rehm 2012). One of the results of such processes of restructuration is that 
the new populist challengers within the party system may enter into government or support 
governments from the outside, as has happened repeatedly in Western Europe by now.  
Thus, together with my colleagues, I have argued (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012) that the new 
right-populist parties which, for more than twenty years now, have spearheaded the nationalist 
reaction to economic (neoliberal reform of the economy including delocalization, liberali-
zation of financial markets, and privatization), cultural (immigration), and political (European 
integration, internationalization of politics) processes of denationalization do not simply 
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articulate a populist challenge to the mainstream parties which habitually govern. Instead, 
they articulate a new structural conflict that opposes globalization ‘losers’ to globalization 
‘winners’. In several countries, the success of these new populist challengers has given rise to 
the transformation of established parties which start to compete for the mobilization of the 
demands of the ‘losers’. Some of these new challengers or transformed established parties 
have, indeed, taken up government responsibilities (e.g. the SVP in Switzerland, the FPÖ in 
Austria, the Lega and the PdL in Italy) or supported minority governments without becoming 
formal members of the governing coalitions (e.g. the Danish People’s Party, and the Dutch 
PVV).  
So far, this new conflict between globalization ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ has above all been 
successfully articulated by new populists from the right. Against the background of the ‘Great 
Recession’, it is important to consider that the consequences of denationalization may also be 
pursued by new populist challengers from the left. While populist challengers on the right 
privilege the political and cultural dimensions of denationalization processes, new populist 
challengers on the left are likely to prefer to frame conflicts linked to denationalization 
processes in social-economic terms. Accordingly, I expect the populist right to mobilize in 
defence of the national identity, the national political community, and of the nation-state, 
while I expect the left’s populist mobilizations to take the form of the defence of the national 
welfare state (e.g. mobilization against Europe in the name of the national social welfare state 
model) as well as in defence of the economic privileges of domestic sectors of the economy 
and of domestic production sites (e.g. mobilization against the delocalization of production 
sites such as the mobilization of the Italian unions in the Pomigliano case, the mobilizations 
against liberalizing directives of the EU Commission, such as the ‘Bolkestein directive’, or 
the mobilizations of Syriza against the austerity policies imposed by the ‘Troika’ in a country 
like Greece). This kind of socially conservative populism of the left is to be distinguished 
from cosmopolitan forms of mobilization of the left (e.g. in favour of a European social model 
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at the European level, in favour of ‘global justice’, a multicultural society, or in support of the 
extension of social rights to immigrants).  
Second, under the pressure of the economic crisis, the erosion of the established parties’ 
representation function may also give rise to a more wholesale rejection of the party system in 
general. The new challengers may revolt against the party system as such. This is what 
Rosanvallon (2006: 271-77) has in mind, when he considers populism as the ‘pure politics of 
non-politics’, the ‘perfect anti-politics’or the ‘absolute counter-democracy’. He identifies 
three characteristic traits of populism as anti-politics: the compulsive and permanent 
stigmatization of the governing authorities, up to the point where they are constituted as an 
inimical power; the total rejection of politics, an apocalyptic vision of politics, which does not 
involve constructive criticism; and the criminalization or ridiculization of the essence of 
power. 
Illustrations of such a radicalized form of populism include Jon Gnarr’s ‘best party’ in Iceland 
or the movement ‘cinque stelle’ of the Italian comic Beppe Grillo. In the local elections in 
Iceland in spring 2010, revolting against the established parties of the country, the voters in 
the country’s capital Reykjavik turned to the ‘best party’ of the comic Jon Gunnar 
Kristinsson, which became the largest party with 35 per cent of the vote and obtained the 
mayor’s position. ‘Jon Gnarr’ had founded the ‘best party’ at the end of 2009 – as a parody of 
traditional politics. In his election campaign, he asked, among other things, for a ‘transparent’ 
handling of corruption and he promised to break all campaign promises. In the Italian national 
elections in February 2013, the ‘movimento cinque stelle’ of the comic Beppe Grillo made no 
less than 25.5 per cent of the vote. Refusing to cooperate with any of the mainstream parties 
to form a government, the Grillini put the Italian party system under increasing strain. Their 
strategy of non-cooperation eventually forced the two mainstream parties to form a grand 
coalition government – a step without precedent in Italian politics, which may yet lead to 
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internal splits in each one of the mainstream coalition partners and to the formation of new 
parties. It is too early to tell, but given the current impasse in the Italian party system, Grillo’s 
success may serve as the catalyst for a profound transformation of the Italian party system. 
In the Italian case, surprisingly, the radical rejection of the mainstream parties still takes place 
in the electoral channel. And, in fact, this radical rejection of party politics may not be as 
clearly distinct from the rise of other new challengers. The anti-parties may transform them-
selves into parties that last and that become regular competitors in the electoral channel. Thus, 
Grillo rejects the idea that he is riding on an anti-political wave, and maintains that his 
movement mobilizes for a fundamental political renewal4. He mobilizes against the rampant 
corruption in Italian politics, and the program of his movement asks for a drastic reduction of 
the costly state, for more direct democracy, and for more federalism. It demands that Italy 
leave the Eurozone and calls for the creation of the United States of Italy. It is critical about 
globalization, it is against the construction of the high speed train line between Lyon and 
Torino, and pleads for the localization of economic structures. As representatives of such anti-
parties get elected, as they are socialized into the governing function of parties (at the local 
level first, at higher levels later on), these groups may be transformed into regular parties, 
even if they keep their populist characteristics to some extent. And even if they do not 
transform themselves into regular parties, such anti-parties may serve as the catalysts that 
transform the party system in a way that restores the representative function to the mainstream 
parties. 
Last, but certainly not least, in the absence of immediately available options in the electoral 
arena, discontented groups of citizens may mobilize outside of the electoral channel and, in 
particular, they may resort to the protest arena, and try to force political concessions from 
political elites by directly appealing to the general public. This is Schattschneider’s (1960) 
                                                     
4 See interview with Beppe Grillo, NZZ, Nr. 113, Mittwoch, 16. Mai 2012: p. 9. 
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idea of the ‘expansion of conflict’. Public protest is designed to unleash a public debate, to 
draw the attention of the public to the grievances of the actors in question, to create 
controversy where there was none, and to obtain the support of the public for the actors’ 
concerns. Discontented citizens are all the more ready to resort to protest, since protest 
mobilization has become increasingly conventional, at least in Western Europe. Western 
European countries have become ‘movement societies’, in the apt term coined by Meyer and 
Tarrow (1998). As this term suggests, political protest has become an integral part of these 
countries’ way of life: protest behaviour is no longer used as a last resort only, but employed 
with greater frequency, by more diverse constituencies, to represent a wider range of claims 
than ever before. We observe the ‘normalization of the unconventional’ (Fuchs 1991). 
Professionalization and institutionalization are changing the social movement into an 
instrument of conventional politics and social movement organizations become rather like 
interest groups. However, while protest becomes conventional across Western Europe, the 
typical action repertoire of protest may still vary from one country to the other. Thus, in 
Southern Europe, the political strike combined with large demonstrations constitutes a core 
element of the protest repertoire, while citizens in Northern Europe are equally likely to 
demonstrate, but much less likely to combine demonstrations with political strikes. 
Strong social movements tend to spawn new political organizations, allowing them to 
stabilize their mobilization capacity. In other words, social movements tend to institutionalize, 
among other things in the form of political parties. Thus, the major party families which exist 
today have come out of social movements of the past. The most recent addition to the party 
system are the Green parties, which have come out of the new social movements of the 1970s.  
All three forms of ‘protest populism’ are likely to benefit from the very same mediatization 
trends that contribute to the erosion of the representation function of the established parties. 
Thus, Mazzoleni (2008: 50) suggests that populist challengers can generally rely on some sort 
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of ‘media complicity’: the media provide a significant degree of support for the rise of 
populist phenomena in general, because, under conditions of mediatization, news coverage 
yields to general popular tastes. Examples of the media’s own populism include their craving 
for the more extreme and scandalous aspects of politics, their dramatization of the political 
language, and their increasing use of populist formats and approaches (talk shows, phone ins, 
solicitation of calls, faxes, and e-mails for response by interviewed politicians etc. (Blumler 
and Kavanagh 1999: 220)). Successful populist challengers are attractive for the media 
because they have news-value: they tend to have charisma, they are typically outsiders, who 
have not been part of the traditional political elites in their respective countries, they share the 
resentment of their clientele, and they are crass enough to express the emotions and ideas of 
these potentials (i.e. who spell out publicly what the ‘common man’ has always thought by 
himself). The Dutch Pim Fortuyn would be an illustrative example of such a political figure 
(see Buruma 2006: Chapter 2), just as the Italian Beppe Grillo. 
These new challengers are also likely to make use of the new forms of communication as I 
have suggested above. Thus, Beppe Grillo, the Italian anti-politician, has made skilful use of a 
mix of on-line communications and local appearances in his campaign for the Italian national 
elections 2013. As a self-styled David taking on not only the entire political class, but also the 
established media (Ruggero 2012), he used the new media to organize on-line primaries for 
the selection of the electoral candidates of his movement, and he mainly made use of blogs – 
an on-line form of communication of rather low interactivity – to communicate his views to 
his followers and to the public at large. In addition, he made public appearances across Italy, 
drawing large crowds, which guaranteed him news value and tv coverage, although he 
explicitly refused to talk to tv journalists and to appear on the tv talk-shows. 
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The rise of populism in Central and Eastern Europe 
As I have pointed out in the introduction, Peter’s discussion of populism has exclusively 
addressed the situation of the party systems in West European countries. However, we also 
find the phenomenon of populism in Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, in these countries, 
populism, if anything, is even more widespread. As we enter the world of Central and Eastern 
European politics, Peter’s analysis no longer applies, but we still can build on his key insight 
that populism is a proximate result of a party system that does not fulfil its representation 
function. In following this insight, we should keep in mind, however, that, in the very 
different world of Central and Eastern European politics, the reasons for the party system’s 
dysfunctions are not the same as in Western Europe. While the mainstream parties of West 
European party systems are no longer adequately representing their constituencies, the 
Central and Eastern European party systems have not yet produced mainstream parties that 
adequately represent their constituencies: in contrast to the party systems of Western Europe, 
the party systems in Central and Eastern Europe have never been institutionalized to the same 
extent.  
The concept of the institutionalization of the party system has been introduced by Mainwaring 
and Scully (1995, 1999). In general, ‘institutionalization refers to a process by which a 
practice or organization becomes well established and widely known, if not universally 
accepted’ (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 4). An institutionalized party system ‘is one in 
which actors develop expectations and behaviour based on the premise that the fundamental 
contours and rules of party competition and behaviour will prevail into the foreseeable future’ 
(Mainwaring 1999: 25). For a party system to be institutionalized, four conditions must obtain 
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 4-6; Mainwaring 1999: 26f.). First and most important is 
stability in the rules and nature of party competition: the configuration of the party system 
does not change from one election to the other, no new challengers appear at each election, 
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the volatility of the electoral outcome is low. Second, the parties have stable roots in society, 
which allows them to structure the preferences of the voters. As a consequence, the parties’ 
relative ideological positions tend to be consistent. Third, the parties are considered to be 
legitimate by the major political actors. Finally, party organizations matter. They are not 
subordinate to the interests of ambitious leaders. They acquire an independent status and 
value of their own.  
When measured by these four criteria, party systems in Central and Eastern Europe appear to 
be little institutionalized. Just like the Latin American party systems, they are characterized by 
an extraordinarily high level of volatility; they have not (yet) developed stable roots in 
society, the concept of cleavages structuring the party system hardly applies to them; they are 
hardly considered legitimate by the citizens of their countries, and their organizations tend to 
be unstable. The most important empirical evidence for the lack of institutionalization of these 
party systems comes from Neff Powell and Tucker (2013), who show that the very high level 
of volatility in these systems since the democratic transition has above all been due to the 
entry and exit of parties, and not to switches between established parties. The lack of institu-
tionalization of these party systems means that it makes no sense to speak of the erosion of the 
parties’ representation function in this part of Europe. However, the fact that Central and 
Eastern European party systems have not yet been institutionalized to the same degree as 
West European party systems makes them even more susceptible to populist phenomena. In 
Central and Eastern Europe, the low level of institutionalization of the party systems provides 
a general opportunity for the rise of new populist challengers.  
This opportunity becomes all the more important, given the widespread dissatisfaction of the 
Central and Eastern European publics with their political elites. The low level of political and 
administrative performance contributes to the constitution of anti-elitist sentiments which 
provide a general breeding ground for populist challengers. Thus, a strong majority in all 
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Central and Eastern European EU member states perceives public officials as acting in a 
corrupt manner when exercising their power. The levels of distrust are especially high in 
Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania and Slovakia. This kind of survey data is confirmed by various 
macro-level ratings, such as the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators or 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. Moreover, sizeable majorities of 
the citizens in these countries feel unfairly treated by their public authorities. As Linde (2012) 
shows, together, perceptions of corruption and feelings of unfair treatment by authorities 
explain a large amount of the lacking regime support (i.e. satisfaction with how democracy 
works) in these countries. There is a deep-seated disenchantment of citizens with democratic 
politics.  
Perceived political corruption, dissatisfaction with government performance and perceived 
lack of representation are, of course, at the origin of a lack of legitimacy not only in Central 
and Eastern Europe. As a matter of fact, as Dahlberg et al. (2013: 21) show, perceived 
corruption and lack of representation have stronger effects on political dissatisfaction in 
established democracies, which makes them suggest that ‘there are greater expectations in 
terms of performance, both on the input as well as on the output side of the democratic system 
in older more established democracies’. But if dissatisfied democrats have greater 
expectations in established democracies, there are greater numbers of dissatisfied democrats 
in the newly emerging democracies (Dahlberg et al. 2013: 15). While these dissatisfied 
democrats constitute a potential for populist mobilization everywhere, my point here is that 
their large numbers in Central and Eastern Europe become particularly conducive to populist 
mobilization in the context of a non-institutionalized party system. 
As a result of this particular combination of circumstances, the populist mobilization takes on 
particular characteristics in Central and Eastern Europe, too. Ucen (2007: 54) calls it the rise 
of a new ‚centrist populism‘:  
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‚The prototypical parties of new populism are non-radical challengers mobilizing 
disappointed electorates against under-performing and morally failing established 
parties....... In a true populist vein, their tough anti-establishment appeal is directed 
against all previous configurations of the ruling elite (although in some cases, 
proponents of the new anti-establishment politics may have been part of this elite). 
Dominance of anti-establishment posture over ideology in political projects may be the 
grounds for considering them the ‘purest’ populist parties, since they are almost 
completely unencumbered by ideological constraints….  In other words, it is possible to 
see them as a moderate manifestation of populist ideology, only lightly attached to more 
complex ideologies and indulging themselves primarily in the critique of the establish-
ment‘. 
Interestingly, such new parties often became the strongest force in parliament in their first 
ever elections, even if they have been indistinguishable from incumbent parties in program-
matic terms. Their newness allows them to claim that they will fight against a corrupt regime 
and political establishment. Their innovative character is typically reduced to a new style of 
communication and to some – rather symbolic – institutional reforms. Examples of such 
parties include the Slovakian Smer (founded in 1999) of the maverick leftist politician Robert 
Fico, which won the elections in 2006, and again in 2012; the National Movement Simeon II 
(NDSV) of the former Bulgarian monarch Simeon, which garnered almost 43 percent of the 
vote and exactly half the seats in the 2001 parliamentary elections, or the three new Baltic 
parties discussed by Sikk (2009): the Lithuanian New Union (Social Liberals) which became 
the second most popular party in Lithuania in its first Elections in 2000; the New Era, the 
winner of 2002 parliamentary elections in Latvia; and the Estonian Res Publica that obtained 
24.6 percent of votes, becoming one of the two strongest parties in parliament in 2003. As 
Sikk observes, ‚anti-incumbency was a defining feature of these parties, as otherwise they 
were politically very similar to some major pre-existing parties. The project of ‚newness‘ as 
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opposed to ‚old politics‘ was highlighted both at the substantive and rhetorical level. The 
parties campaigned for more open and accountable policies‘. 
 
Conclusion 
In his preface to the volume which republishes the classic papers of his mentor – Hans 
Daalder, Peter Mair (2011a: xii) writes that ‘reading and studying such classics also serves a 
more practical purpose. It reminds us of the important questions that continue to face compa-
rative politics, and it helps us to avoid re-inventing the wheel, generation after generation’. In 
addressing the rise of populism in West European democracies, Peter has certainly raised an 
important question in a series of texts that have already become classics in his lifetime.  
Building on his assessment of the double populist challenge faced by West European polities 
– a populist democracy without parties at the centre of the political system giving rise to 
populist protest at its periphery – I have made an attempt to put his interpretation into a new 
perspective. While largely sharing his interpretation of the overall structural trends giving rise 
to the populist challenges in West European countries – an erosion of the representation 
function of the parties buttressed by the increasing importance of the supra- and international 
level of governance and by the increasing role of the media in national politics –, I have been 
struck by the   static character of his assessment. Connecting his interpretation to my own 
work, and benefiting from hindsight – especially from the knowledge about the electoral fall-
out of the Great Recession, I have suggested that there are three forms of ‘protest populism’, 
all of which may eventually end up transforming the West European party systems in the 
name of the new structuring conflicts that characterize contemporary European societies.  
In addition, I have proposed to extend the scope of Peter’s argument to the less established 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, where populism is also rooted in the debilitated 
state of the party system’s representation function, but where this function has never been 
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institutionalized properly. As I have proposed, the populist challenges to the party systems of 
Central and Eastern Europe are mainly linked to their lack of institutionalization, as well as to 
the low quality performance of the public authorities in these countries.  
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